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Abstract
Kurz and Napel (2015) proved that the voting system of the EU council (based on
the 2014 population data) cannot be represented as the intersection of six weighted
games, i.e., its dimension is at least 7. This set a new record for real-world voting
rules and the authors posed the exact determination as a challenge. Recently, Chen,
Cheung, and Ng (2019) showed that the dimension is at most 24.
We provide the first improved lower bound and show that the dimension is at least
8.
Keywords: simple games · weighted games · dimension · real-world voting sys-
tems.
1 Introduction
Simple games are cooperative games that are commonly used to describe real-world voting
systems. Considering a fixed, finite set M of voting members, a simple game is given
by a collection W of subsets of M satisfying the monotonicity property: C ∈ W and
C ⊆ C ′ ⊆M implies C ′ ∈ W. The sets inW are called winning coalitions, and each subset
ofM that is not inW is called a losing coalition. A fundamental class of simple games are
weighted games whose winning coalitions can be written as
W =
{
C ⊆M :
∑
m∈C
am ≥ β
}
for some a ∈ RM≥0 and β ∈ R. It is a basic fact that every simple game is the intersection of
finitely many weighted games, and hence we may define the dimension of a simple game
W to be the smallest number of weighted games whose intersection isW.
Determining the dimension of (simple games associated to) real-world voting systems
has been of particular interest in social choice theory, see, e.g., Taylor and Pacelli [8].
While many voting rules are actually weighted and hence have dimension one, examples
of dimension two are given by the US federal legislative system [9] and the amendment
of the Canadian constitution [6]. A voting rule of dimension three has been adopted by
the Legislative Council of Hong Kong [2].
A new record was set with the change of the EU (European Union) council’s voting
system by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2014. Based on the population data of 2014, Kurz and
Napel [7] showed that its dimension is at least 7 and at most 13368, and they posed the
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exact determination as a challenge to the community. In response, Chen, Cheung, and Ng
[1] were able to reduce the upper bound to 24.
We provide the first improved lower bound and show that the dimension is at least
8. Although we will not rely on this interpretation in what follows, the idea behind our
lower bound is based on the observation that the dimension of a simple game W can be
seen as the chromatic number of a particular hypergraphH: the nodes of H are the losing
coalitions, and a set of losing coalitions N forms a hyperedge iff N ∩ W ′ 6= ∅ for every
weighted game W ′ ⊇ W. The proof of Kurz and Napel [7] establishes that H contains a
clique of cardinality 7, which directly implies that the chromatic number of H is at least
7. This idea has been used previously in the context of lower bounds on sizes of integer
programming formulations [4, 5, 3]. While we have not found any simple subgraph of
larger chromatic number, we will show that H contains a hypergraph on 15 nodes whose
chromatic number is 8.
Outline. In Section 2 we introduce the concept of non-separable subsets of the losing
coalitions of a simple gameW. A family F of such subsets can be thought of as a subgraph
of the above hypergraph. Moreover, we consider the notion of a k-cover for such a set F ,
which can be seen as a node-coloring of the respective subgraph with k colors. Accordingly,
we will see that if the dimension of W is at most k, then there exists a k-cover for each
F . In Section 3 we consider the simple game associated to the EU council and give a
construction of a set F , for which no 7-cover exists. A proof of the latter fact will be given
in Section 4.
2 Strategy
In what follows, we consider simple games on a common fixed ground setM .
Definition 1. Let W be a simple game and N be any set of losing coalitions of W. We
say that N is non-separable with respect to W if every weighted game W ′ ⊇ W satisfies
W ′ ∩ N 6= ∅.
From the definition it is immediate that a simple game is weighted if and only if no set
of losing coalitions is non-separable. So, the existence of a single non-separable set yields
that the dimension of a simple game is at least two. To obtain a larger lower bound, the
following notion will be useful.
Definition 2. Let W be a simple game with losing coalitions L, and let N1, . . . ,Nt ⊆
L be non-separable with respect to W. A k-cover of (N1, . . . ,Nt) is a collection of sets
L1, . . . ,Lk ⊆ L such that
1. L1 ∪ · · · ∪ Lk = N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nt and
2. Ni * Lj for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
In order to obtain a lower bound on the dimension, we will exploit the following
observation.
Lemma 1. Let W be a simple game with non-separable sets N1, . . . ,Nt. If W has dimension
at most k, then there exists a k-cover for (N1, . . . ,Nt).
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Proof. IfW has dimension at most k, then there exist k weighted gamesW1, . . . ,Wk such
that
⋂k
i=1Wi = W. For i ∈ {1, . . . , k} define Li as the intersection of the losing coalitions
inWi and L
∗ := N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nt.
We claim that (L1, . . . ,Lk) is a k-cover of (N1, . . . ,Nt). In order to show Property 1,
first observe that L1 ∪ · · · ∪ Lk ⊆ L
∗ holds. Now, for any ℓ ∈ L∗ ⊆ L we have ℓ /∈ W and
hence there is an i ∈ {1, . . . , k} with ℓ /∈ Wi, which implies ℓ ∈ Li.
For Property 2, assume that Ni ⊆ Lj holds for some i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
This means that each coalition inNi is losing forWj, meaning that Ni andWj are disjoint.
This contradicts the fact that Ni is non-separable with respect to W since Wj ⊇ W is
weighted.
In what follows, we will consider the simple game associated with the EU council and
construct a collection of non-separable losing coalitions that does not permit a 7-covering.
By Lemma 1 this implies that the dimension must be at least 8.
3 Our Construction
Let us give a formal definition of the simple game associated to the EU council based on
the population data of 2014, as considered by Kurz and Napel [7]. In 2014, the European
Union consisted of 28 members and hence we may fix M := {1, . . . , 28}. In the voting
system of the EU council, a coalition is winning if
1. it contains at least 55% of all members states and
2. it unites at least 65% of the total EU population,
or
3. it consists of at least 25 of the 28 member states.
Denoting the weighted game associated with rule i by Wi and the simple game that rep-
resents the voting system of the EU council byWEU, we thus have
WEU = (W1 ∩W2) ∪W3.
Note that W2 depends on the population of each member state. As in [7], we will work
with the data depicted in Table 1. From these numbers, it can be seen that the following
coalitions are losing with respect toWEU.
L1 := {2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
L2 := {1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
L3 := {2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27}
L4 := {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
L5 := {2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
L6 := {2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
L7 := {3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
L8 := {2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
L9 := {1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
L10 := {2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
L11 := {1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
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# Member state Population # Member state Population
1 Germany 80 780 000 15 Austria 8 507 786
2 France 65 856 609 16 Bulgaria 7 245 677
3 United Kingdom 64 308 261 17 Denmark 5 627 235
4 Italy 60 782 668 18 Finland 5 451 270
5 Spain 46 507 760 19 Slovakia 5 415 949
6 Poland 38 495 659 20 Ireland 4 604 029
7 Romania 19 942 642 21 Croatia 4 246 700
8 Netherlands 16 829 289 22 Lithuania 2 943 472
9 Belgium 11 203 992 23 Slovenia 2 061 085
10 Greece 10 992 589 24 Latvia 2 001 468
11 Czech Republic 10 512 419 25 Estonia 1 315 819
12 Portugal 10 427 301 26 Cyprus 858 000
13 Hungary 9 879 000 27 Luxembourg 549 680
14 Sweden 9 644 864 28 Malta 425 384
Table 1: Population data of the European Union on 01.01.2014, see also [7, Table 1].
L12 := {1, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
L13 := {2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28}
L14 := {1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
L15 := {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15}
Next, we construct non-separable subsets with respect toWEU that consist of the above los-
ing coalitions. In order to verify that these subsets are indeed non-separable, the following
lemma is helpful.
Lemma 2. LetW be a simple game and letW∗ andN be sets of winning and losing coalitions
for W, respectively, such that |W∗| ≥ |N |. If
|{W ∈ W∗ : m ∈W}| = |{L ∈ N : m ∈ L}|
holds for all m ∈M , then N is non-separable with respect to W.
Proof. Consider any weighted game W ′ = {C ⊆ M :
∑
m∈C am ≥ β} ⊇ W with a ∈ R
M
≥0
and β ∈ R. Then we have
∑
L∈N
∑
m∈L
am =
∑
W∈W∗
∑
m∈W
am ≥ β |W
∗| .
The last inequality holds because all elements of W∗ are contained in W ′. Thus, there
must exist some L ∈ N , such that
∑
m∈L
am ≥ β ·
|W∗|
|N |
≥ β.
Therefore, we have L ∈ W ′ and hence W ′ ∩ N 6= ∅. Since this holds for any weighted
gameW ′ ⊇ W, N is non-separable with respect toW.
We claim that the following 2-element subsets of the above losing coalitions are non-
separable.
{L1, L5}, {L1, L8}, {L1, L9}, {L1, L10}, {L1, L11}, {L1, L13}, {L1, L14}, {L1, L15},
{L2, L3}, {L2, L4}, {L2, L5}, {L2, L6}, {L2, L7}, {L2, L8}, {L2, L10}, {L2, L11}, {L2, L15},
4
{L3, L4}, {L3, L5}, {L3, L7}, {L3, L9}, {L3, L10}, {L3, L12}, {L3, L13}, {L3, L14}, {L3, L15},
{L4, L6}, {L4, L8}, {L4, L9}, {L4, L11}, {L4, L12}, {L4, L13}, {L4, L14}, {L4, L15},
{L5, L7}, {L5, L8}, {L5, L11}, {L5, L14}, {L5, L15},
{L6, L7}, {L6, L8}, {L6, L9}, {L6, L11}, {L6, L13}, {L6, L14}, {L6, L15},
{L7, L9}, {L7, L10}, {L7, L11}, {L7, L13}, {L7, L14}, {L7, L15},
{L8, L9}, {L8, L10}, {L8, L11}, {L8, L12}, {L8, L14}, {L8, L15},
{L9, L10}, {L9, L11}, {L9, L12}, {L9, L13}, {L9, L14}, {L9, L15},
{L10, L11}, {L10, L14}, {L10, L15},
{L11, L12}, {L11, L13}, {L11, L15},
{L12, L13}, {L12, L15},
{L13, L14}, {L13, L15},
{L14, L15} (1)
To see that each above set N := {Li, Lj} is non-separable, we make use of Lemma 2
as follows. If Li, Lj 6= L15, we have that Li and Lj are contained inW1 \W2. Pick a set of
states A ⊆ Li ∪Lj \ (Li ∩Lj) of minimum total population such thatW1 := A ∪ (Li ∩Lj)
is contained in W3 ⊆ W. For all above pairs it can be checked that W2 := (Li ∪ Lj) \ A
is contained in W1 ∩ W2 ⊆ W. By construction, N and W
∗ := {W1,W2} satisfy the
assumptions of Lemma 2 and hence N is indeed non-separable.
Otherwise, we may assume that Lj = L15. For all above pairs, exchanging the two
members with the least population in Li \ L15 with the member of largest population in
L15 \ Li, results in two winning sets W1,W2. Again, N and W
∗ := {W1,W2} satisfy the
assumptions of Lemma 2, implying that N is non-separable.
Moreover, the following 3-element subsets of losing coalitions are also non-separable.
{L1, L2, L12}, {L1, L4, L7}, {L1, L6, L12}, {L4, L5, L10}, {L5, L10, L12} (2)
To see that these sets are non-separable, consider the following sets of winning coalitions.
W1 := {1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
W2 := {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
W3 := {3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
W4 := {1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
W5 := {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
W6 := {2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
W7 := {1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
W8 := {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
W9 := {2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
W10 := {3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
W11 := {1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
W12 := {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
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Observing that the pairs
({W2,W7,W11}, {L1, L2, L12}),
({W3,W10,W12}, {L1, L4, L7}),
({W4,W8,W10}, {L1, L6, L12}),
({W2,W5,W9}, {L4, L5, L10}), and
({W1,W2,W6}, {L5, L10, L12})
satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 2, we see that the sets in (2) are indeed non-separable.
In the next section, we show that the non-separable sets in (1) and (2) do not admit a
7-cover. Recall that this implies that the dimension must be at least 8 by Lemma 1.
4 Proof that no 7-cover can exist
For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that the non-separable sets in (1) and (2)
admit a 7-cover. This implies that there exist sets L1, . . . ,L7 ⊆ {L1, . . . , L15} such that
(i) each Lj is an inclusion-wise maximal subset of {L1, . . . , L15} that does not contain
any of the sets in (1) and (2), and
(ii) L1 ∪ · · · ∪ L7 = {L1, . . . , L15}.
It can be easily verified that the only sets satisfying (i) are the following.
{L1, L2}, {L1, L3, L6}, {L1, L4}, {L1, L7, L12}, {L2, L9}, {L2, L12, L14}, {L2, L13},
{L3, L8}, {L3, L11}, {L4, L5}, {L4, L7}, {L4, L10}, {L5, L6, L10}, {L5, L6, L12},
{L5, L9}, {L5, L10, L13}, {L6, L10, L12}, {L7, L8}, {L8, L13}, {L11, L14}, {L15} (3)
In what follows, for a weight-vector w = (w1, . . . , w15) ∈ R15, let us define the weight of a
set L′ ⊆ {1, . . . , 15} as w(L′) :=
∑
i∈L′ wi.
Suppose first that none of the sets L1, . . . ,L7 is equal to {L1, L3, L6}. In this case,
consider the weight-vector
w = (1/2, 0, 1, 1/2, 0, 1, 1/2, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1)
and observe that the weight of each set in (3) that is distinct from {L1, L3, L6} is at most
1. Thus, the weight of each set L1, . . . ,L7 is at most 1, and we obtain
7 < 15
2
= w({1, . . . , 15}) = w(L1 ∪ · · · ∪ L7) ≤ w(L1) + · · ·+ w(L7) ≤ 7,
a contradiction.
It remains to consider the case that one of the sets L1, . . . ,L7 is equal to {L1, L3, L6},
say L1. Consider the weight-vector
w = (0, 1/3, 0, 2/3, 1/3, 0, 1/3, 2/3, 2/3, 1/3, 1, 2/3, 1/3, 0, 1)
and observe that the weight of each set in (3) is at most 1, and that w(L1) = 0. Thus, we
have
6 < 19
3
= w({1, . . . , 15}) = w(L1 ∪ · · · ∪ L7) ≤ w(L2) + · · ·+ w(L7) ≤ 6,
another contradiction. This completes our proof.
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